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Abstract. The timed concurrent constraint programing model (tcc) is
a declarative framework, closely related to First-Order Linear Temporal
Logic (FLTL), for modeling reactive systems. The universal tcc formal-
ism (utcc) is an extension of tcc with the ability to express mobility.
Here mobility is understood as communication of private names as typ-
ically done for mobile systems and security protocols.
This paper is devoted to the study of 1) the expressiveness of utcc and
2) its semantic foundations. As applications of this study, we also state
3) a noteworthy decidability result for the well-established framework of
FLTL and 4) bring new semantic insights into the modeling of security
protocols.
More precisely, we show that in contrast to tcc, utcc is Turing-powerful
by encoding Minsky machines. The encoding uses a monadic constraint
system allowing us to prove a new result for a fragment of FLTL: The
undecidability of the validity problem for monadic FLTL without equal-
ity and function symbols. This result refutes a decidability conjecture for
FLTL from a previous paper. It also justifies the restriction imposed in
previous decidability results on the quantification of flexible-variables.
We shall also show that as in tcc, utcc processes can be semantically rep-
resented as partial closure operators. The representation is fully abstract
wrt the input-output behavior of processes for a meaningful fragment of
the utcc. This shows that mobility can be captured as closure operators
over an underlying constraint system. As an application we identify a
language for security protocols that can be represented as closure oper-
ators over a cryptographic constraint system.
Keywords: Concurrent Constraint Programming, First-order Linear
Temporal Logic, Closure Operators, Security Protocols
1 Introduction
Timed concurrent constraint programming (tcc) [24] is a declarative temporal
formalism from concurrency theory for modeling reactive systems. The tcc cal-
culus combines the traditional operational view of process calculi with a declar-
ative one based upon first-order linear-time temporal logic (FLTL). The tcc
language is parametric in an underlying constraint system specifying the basic
constraints (pieces of information) that agents can tell or ask during execution
(e.g, x > 42).
Both the computational expressiveness and semantic foundations of tcc have
been thoroughly studied in the literature [24, 22, 28]. This allowed for a better
understanding of tcc and its relation with other formalisms. In particular, the
expressiveness study in [28] shows that tcc processes can be represented as finite-
state Bu¨chi automata [8]. The denotational semantics study in [24] shows that
tcc processes can be compositionally interpreted as closure operators (mono-
tonic, idempotent, and extensive functions) over sequences of constraints.
Universal tcc [23], henceforth utcc, is an extension of the tcc calculus. The
purpose of the extension is to add to tcc the expressiveness needed for modeling
mobility while preserving its elegant closure-operator semantic characterization.
(Mobility refers to the communication of private names as typically done for
mobile systems and security protocols in Concurrency Theory). Although [23]
illustrates several utcc examples involving mobility, no formal statement about
the expressiveness of utcc nor the preservation of the closure-operator semantics
has been previously given.
In this paper we shall study the expressiveness of utcc in terms of its com-
putational power and semantic characterization. We shall show that 1) unlike
tcc processes, utcc processes can represent Turing-powerful formalisms. Fur-
thermore, we shall show that despite this extra expressiveness as tcc processes
2) utcc processes can still be compositionally interpreted as partial closure op-
erators. We shall also show the applicability of this declarative framework and
the elegant theory of concurrent constraint programming to other domains of
computer science. By using 1) we shall state a new insightful undecidability re-
sult for the well-established framework of FLTL. As an application of 2) we shall
also bring new semantic insights into the modeling of security protocols. These
two applications correspond to 3) and 4) in the contributions below.
Contributions. More precisely, to show 1) above we shall encode in utcc Minsky
machines [20]. The encoding of Minsky machines in utcc will be given in terms
of a very simple decidable constraint system involving only monadic predicates
and no equality nor function symbols. The importance of using such a constraint
system is that it will allow us to use utcc to state a new impossibility result
for monadic FLTL and the main technical application of this paper: Namely, 3)
the undecidability of the validity problem for monadic FLTL without functions
symbols and equality. In fact, we show that this FLTL is strongly incomplete
which of course implies its undecidability. Notice that this result contrasts the
standard decidability result of (untimed) monadic classic first-order logic [7].
It is worth noticing that there are several works in the literature addressing
the decidability of fragments of FLTL and in particular the monadic one [1,
18, 27, 16, 21]. The above-mentioned result is insightful in that it answers an is-
sue raised in a previous work and justifies some restrictions on monadic FLTL in
other decidability results by showing them to be necessary. Namely, in [28] it was
suggested that one could dispense with the restriction to negation-free formula
in the decidability result for the Pnueli’s FLTL fragment there studied. Our un-
decidability result actually contradicts this conjecture since with negation that
logic would correspond to the FLTL here presented. Furthermore, another work
in [18] shows the decidability of monadic FLTL. This seemingly contradictory
statement arises from the fact that unlike this work, [18] disallows, without a
technical explanation, quantification over flexible variables. Our results, there-
fore, show that restriction to be necessary for decidability thus filling a gap
on the decidability study of monadic FLTL. We shall elaborate more on these
related results in Section 4.2.
As for 2) above, by building on the semantics of tcc given in [24] we show that
the input-output behavior of any utcc process can be characterized as a partial
closure-operator. Because of additional technical difficulties posed by utcc, the
codomain of the closure-operators is more involved than that for tcc. Namely,
we shall use sequences of future-free temporal formulae (constraints) rather than
sequences of basic constraints as in tcc. We shall also give a compositional
denotational account of this closure-operator characterization. We shall show
that closure-operator denotation of utcc is fully abstract wrt the input-output
behavior of processes for a significant fragment of utcc. This in particular shows
that mobility in utcc can be elegantly represented as closure operators over some
underlying constraint system.
As an application of the above-mentioned semantic result, we shall 4) iden-
tify a process language for security protocols that can be represented as closure
operators. This language arises as a specialization of utcc with a particular
cryptographic constraint systems. We argue that the interpretation of the be-
havior of protocols as closure operators is a natural one: E.g., suppose f is a
closure-operator denoting a spy inferring information from the one he sees on
the network. By extensiveness (f(w)  w), the spy produces new information
from the one he obtains, by monotonicity (w  v implies f(w)  f(w)) the
more information the spy gets, the more he will infer, and finally by idempo-
tence (f(f(w)) = f(w)) the spy infers as much as possible from the info he gets.
To our knowledge no closure operator denotational account has previously been
given in the context of calculi for security protocols.
All in all, this paper gives an expressiveness account of a declarative frame-
work in terms of computational power and semantic characterization, and im-
portantly, with novel applications to other domains, namely FLTL and security
protocols.
Organization. The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives some preliminar-
ies and Section 3 recalls the notions and definitions of utcc. The expressiveness
study and its application to FLTL is presented in Section 4. The closure-operator
semantics and its application to security protocols is given in Section 5. Finally,
we discuss the related work in Section 6.
2 Preliminaries
In this section we recall the notions of constraint systems and Linear-Time Tem-
poral Logic (FLTL).
Constraint Systems. Concurrent Constraint Programming (CCP) calculi [26]
are parametric in a constraint system. A constraint system can be represented
as a pair (Σ,∆) where Σ is a signature of function and predicate symbols,
and ∆ is a first-order theory over Σ. Given a constraint system (Σ,∆), let L
be its underlying first-order language with variables x, y, . . ., and the standard
logic symbols ¬,∧,∨,⇒,⇔,∃,∀, true and false. The set of constraints C with
typical elements c, d, . . . is given by the set of formulae over L modulo logical
equivalence. We say that c entails d in ∆, written c ⊢∆ d, iff (c ⇒ d) ∈ ∆ (i.e.,
iff c⇒ d is true in all models of ∆). We shall omit “∆” in ⊢∆ when no confusion
arises. For operational reasons ⊢ is often required to be decidable.
Let T be the set of terms induced by Σ with typical elements t, t′, ... We
shall use
.
= to denote syntactic term equivalence (e.g. x
.
= x and x 6
.
= y). We use
~t for a sequence of terms t1, . . . , tn with length |~t| = n. If |~t| = 0 then ~t is written
as ǫ. We use c[~t/~x], where |~t| = |~x| and xi’s are pairwise distinct, to denote c
with the free occurrences of xi replaced with ti. The substitution [~t/~x] will be
similarly applied to other syntactic entities.
Temporal Formulae and Constraints. In the following sections we shall make
use of notions from First-Order Linear-Time Temporal Logic (FLTL). Here we
recall the syntax and semantics of this logic. See [17] for further details.
Definition 1. Given a constraint system with a first-order language L, the LTL
formulae we use are given by the syntax:
F,G, . . . := c | F ∧G | ¬F | ∃xF | ⊖ F | ◦F | F.
where c is a constraint in L, from now on also referred to as state formula.
The modalities ⊖F, ◦F and F stand for resp., that F holds previously, next
and always. We use ∀xF for ¬∃x¬F , and the eventual modality ✸F as an ab-
breviation of ¬¬F .
We presuppose the reader is familiar with the basic concepts of Model Theory.
The non-logical symbols of L are given meaning in an underlying L-structure, or
L-model,M(L) = (I,D). (They are interpreted via I as relations over a domain
D of the corresponding arity). A state s is a mapping assigning to each variable
x in L a value s[x] in D. This interpretation is extended to L-expressions in the
usual way (e.g. s[f(x)] = I(f)(s[x])). We write s |=M(L) c iff c is true wrt s in
M(L). The state s is an x-variant of s′ iff s′[y] = s[y] for each y 6= x. We use σ
to range over infinite sequences of states. We say that σ is an x-variant of σ′ iff
for each i ≥ 0, σ(i) (the i-th state in σ) is an x-variant of σ′(i) .
Furthermore, the variables are partitioned into rigid and flexible variables.
For the rigid variables, each σ must satisfy the rigidity condition: If x is rigid
then for all s, s′ in σ s[x] = s′[x]. If x is a flexible variable then different states
in σ may assign different values to x.
Definition 2. We say that σ satisfies F in an L-structureM(L), written σ |=M(L)
F, iff 〈σ, 0〉 |=M(L) F where:
〈σ, i〉 |=M(L) true
〈σ, i〉 6|=M(L) false
〈σ, i〉 |=M(L) c iff σ(i) |=M(L) c
〈σ, i〉 |=M(L) ¬F iff 〈σ, i〉 6|=M(L) F
〈σ, i〉 |=M(L) F ∧G iff 〈σ, i〉 |=M(L) F and 〈σ, i〉 |=M(L) G
〈σ, i〉 |=M(L) ⊖F iff i > 0 and 〈σ, i− 1〉 |=M(L) F
〈σ, i〉 |=M(L) ◦F iff 〈σ, i+ 1〉 |=M(L) F
〈σ, i〉 |=M(L) F iff for all j ≥ i, 〈σ, j〉 |=M(L) F
〈σ, i〉 |=M(L) ∃xF iff for some x-variant σ
′ofσ, 〈σ′, i〉 |=M(L) F
We say that F is valid in M(L) iff for all σ, σ |=M(L) F . F is said to be valid
if F is valid for every model M(L).
Definition 3 (FLTL Theories). Given a constraint system (∆,Σ) with first-
order language L, the FLTL theory induced by ∆, T (∆) is the set of FLTL
sentences that are valid in all the L-structures (or L-models) of ∆. We write
F ⊢T (∆) G iff (F ⇒ G) ∈ T (∆). We omit “(∆)” in ⊢T (∆) when no confusion
arises.
Closure Operators. Finally we recall the notion of (partial) closure operator that
we shall use in Section 5. Given a partially ordered set (S,≤), a partial closure
operator on S is a function f : S → S with the following properties: For all
x ∈ S
1. Extensiveness: x ≤ f(x).
2. Idempotence: f(f(x)) = f(x).
Furthermore, f is a closure operator if it also satisfies
3 Monotonicity: for all x, y ∈ S, if x ≤ y then f(x) ≤ f(y).
A fundamental derived property of a closure operator is that it is uniquely de-
termined by its set of fixed points.
3 Universal Timed CCP
In this section we first describe the temporal concurrent constraint (tcc) model
[24] following the presentation in [22]. We then recall the universal tcc model
(utcc) introduced in [23].
Timed CCP. The tcc calculus extends CCP for timed systems [24]. Time is
conceptually divided into time intervals (or time units). In a particular time
interval, a CCP process P gets an input c from the environment, it executes
with this input as the initial store, and when it reaches its resting point, it
outputs the resulting store d to the environment. The resting point determines
also a residual process Q which is then executed in the next time interval. The
resulting store d is not automatically transferred to the next time interval.
Definition 4. Processes P,Q, . . . in tcc are built from constraints in the un-
derlying constraint system by the following syntax:
P,Q := skip | tell(c) | when c do P | P ‖ Q |
(local ~x; c)P | nextP | unless c nextP | !P
with the variables in ~x being pairwise distinct.
The process skip does nothing and tell(c) adds c to the store in the current
time interval. If in the current time interval c can eventually be derived from
the store, the ask process when c do P evolves into P within the same time
interval. Otherwise when c do P evolves into skip. P ‖ Q denotes P and Q
running in parallel during the current time interval and (local ~x; c)P binds ~x
in P by declaring them private to P under a constraint c. The bound variables
bv(Q) (free variables fv(Q)) are those with a bound (a not bound) occurrence
in Q.
The unit-delay nextP executes P in the next time interval. The time-out
unless c nextP is also an unit-delay, but P is executed in the next time unit iff
c is not entailed by the final store at the current time interval. We use nextnP
as short for next . . .nextP , with next repeated n times. Finally, the replication
!P means P ‖ nextP ‖ next2P ‖ . . ., i.e., unboundedly many copies of P but
one at a time.
3.1 The Language of UTCC
In [23] the authors introduced the Universal Timed CCP calculus (utcc) by
extending the tcc language with an abstraction operator. This calculus allows
for mobility behavior in the sense of the π-calculus [19], i.e. generation and
communication of private channels or links. In this section we recall the notion
of abstractions in utcc central to its expressivity. Later we present its operational
semantics. See [23] for further details.
In utcc, the ask operation when c do P is replaced with a parametric ask
of the form (abs ~x; c)P . This process can be viewed as an abstraction of the
process P on the variables ~x under the constraint (or with the guard) c. From
a programming language perspective, ~x in (local ~x; c)P can be viewed as the
local variables of P while ~x in (abs ~x; c)P as the formal parameters of P.
From a logic perspective abstractions have a pleasant duality with the local
operator: The processes (local ~x; c)P and (abs ~x; c)P correspond, resp., to the
existential and universal formulae ∃~x(c∧ FP ) and ∀~x(c⇒ FP ) where FP corre-
sponds to P . We shall elaborate more on this logical meaning of utcc processes
in Section 4.2.
Definition 5 (utcc processes). The utcc processes result from replacing in
the syntax in Definition 4 the expression when c do P with (abs ~x; c)P with
the variables in ~x being pairwise distinct.
Intuitively, Q = (abs ~x; c)P executes P [~t/~x] in the current time interval for
all the sequences of terms ~t s.t c[~t/~x] is entailed by the store. The process Q
binds the variables ~x in P and c. Sets fv(.) and bv(.), are extended accordingly.
Furthermore Q evolves into skip after the end of the time unit, i.e. abstractions
are not persistent when passing from one time-unit to the next one.
Notation 1 We use when c do P for the empty abstraction (abs ǫ; c)P. We
write (local ~x)P as a short for (local ~x; true)P . The derived operator (wait ~x; c) do P
waits, possibly for several time units until for some ~t, c[~t/~x] holds. Then it exe-
cutes P [~t/~x]. More precisely,
(wait ~x; c) do P
def
= (local stop, go) tell(out′(go))
‖!unless out′(stop) next tell(out′(go))
‖! (abs ~x; c ∧ out′(go)) (P ‖! tell(out′(stop))
where stop, go /∈ fv(P ).We shall use whenever c do P as a short for (wait ǫ; c) do P .
Mobile links. We conclude this section with a small example from [23]
illustrating how mobility is obtained from the interplay between abstractions
and local processes.
Example 1 (Mobility). LetΣ be a signature with the unary predicates out1, out2, . . .
and a constant 0. Let ∆ be the set of axioms over Σ valid in first-order logic.
Let
P = (abs y; out1(y)) tell(out2(y))
Q = (local z) (tell(out1(z)) ‖
when out2(z) do next tell(out2(0)))
Intuitively, if a link y is sent on channel out1, P forwards it on out2 . Now, Q
sends its private link z on out1 and if it gets it back on out2 it outputs 0 on
out2 .
3.2 An Operational Semantics for UTCC
The structural operational semantics (SOS) of utcc considers transitions be-
tween process-store configurations 〈P, c〉 with stores represented as constraints
and processes quotiented by ≡. We use γ, γ′, . . . to range over configurations.
Definition 6. Let ≡ be the smallest congruence satisfying: 0) P ≡ Q if they
differ only by a renaming of bound variables 1) P ‖ skip ≡ P , 2) P ‖ Q ≡ Q ‖ P ,
3) P ‖ (Q ‖ R) ≡ (P ‖ Q) ‖ R, 4) P ‖ (local ~x; c)Q ≡ (local ~x; c) (P ‖ Q) if
~x 6∈ fv(P ), 5) (local ~x; c) skip ≡ skip. Extend ≡ by decreeing that 〈P, c〉 ≡ 〈Q, c〉
iff P ≡ Q.
The SOS transitions are given by the relations −→ and =⇒ in Table 1. The
internal transition 〈P, d〉 −→ 〈P ′, d′〉 should be read as “P with store d reduces,
in one internal step, to P ′ with store d′ ”. The observable transition P
(c,d)
====⇒ R
should be read as “P on input c, reduces in one time unit to R and outputs
d”. The observable transitions are obtained from finite sequences of internal
transitions.
RT
〈tell(c), d〉 −→ 〈skip, d ∧ c〉
RP
〈P, c〉 −→
˙
P ′, d
¸
〈P ‖ Q, c〉 −→
˙
P ′ ‖ Q, d
¸
RL
〈P, c ∧ (∃~xd)〉 −→
˙
P ′, c′ ∧ (∃~xd)
¸
〈(local ~x; c)P, d〉 −→
˙
(local ~x; c′)P ′, d ∧ ∃~xc′
¸
RU
d ⊢ c
〈unless c next P, d〉 −→ 〈skip, d〉
RR
〈!P, d〉 −→ 〈P ||next !P, d〉
RA
d ⊢ c[~t/~x] |~t| = |~x|
〈(abs ~x; c)P, d〉 −→
˙
P [~t/~x] ‖ (abs ~x; c ∧ ~x 6= ~t )P, d
¸
RS
γ1 −→ γ2
γ′1 −→ γ
′
2
if γ1 ≡ γ
′
1 and γ2 ≡ γ
′
2
RO
〈P, c〉 −→∗ 〈Q, d〉 6−→
P
(c,d)
====⇒ F (Q)
Table 1. Internal and observable reductions. ≡ and F are given in Definitions 6 and
7. In RA, ~x 6= ~t denotes
W
1≤i≤|~x| xi 6= ti. If |~x| = 0, ~x 6= ~t is defined as false.
We only describe some of the rules in Table 1 due to space restrictions. The
other rules are standard, easily seen to realize the operational intuitions given
above (see [22] for further details). As clarified below, the seemingly missing
rules for “next” and “unless” processes are given by RO.
We dwell a little upon the description of Rule RL as it may seem somewhat
complex. Consider Q = (localx; c)P in Rule RL. The global store is d and
the local store is c. We distinguish between the external (corresponding to Q)
and the internal point of view (corresponding to P ). From the internal point
of view, the information about x, possibly appearing in the “global” store d,
cannot be observed. Thus, before reducing P we first hide the information about
x that Q may have in d by existentially quantifying x in d. Similarly, from the
external point of view, the observable information about x that the reduction of
internal agent P may produce (i.e., c′) cannot be observed. Thus we hide it by
existentially quantifying x in c′ before adding it to the global store. Additionally,
we make c′ the new private store of the evolution of the internal process.
Rule RA describes the behavior of (abs ~x; c)P . If the store entails c[~t/~x]
then P [~t/~x] is executed. Additionally, the abstraction persists in the current
time interval to allow other potential replacements of ~x in P but c is augmented
with xi 6= ti to avoid executing P [~t/~x] again.
Rule RO says that an observable transition from P labeled with (c, d) is
obtained from a terminating sequence of internal transitions from 〈P, c〉 to a
〈Q, d〉. The process R to be executed in the next time interval is equivalent to
F (Q) (the “future” of Q). F (Q) is obtained by removing from Q abstractions
and any local information which has been stored in Q, and by “unfolding” the
sub-terms within “next” and “unless” expressions.
Definition 7. Let F be a partial function defined as:
F (P ) =


skip if P = skip
skip if P = (abs ~x; c)Q
F (P1) ‖ F (P2) if P = P1 ‖ P2
(local ~x)F (Q) if P = (local ~x; c)Q
Q if P = nextQ
Q if P = unless c nextQ
Notation 2 We shall denote with Cω the set of infinite sequences of constraints
with typical elements α, α′, . . . . Given c ∈ C, cω represents the constraint c.c . . . .
The i-th element in α is denoted by α(i).
Input-Output Behavior. We will use the following input-output relations over
utcc processes.
Definition 8 (Input-Output Relations). Given α = c1.c2... and α
′ = c′1.c
′
2...,
we write P
(α,α′)
====⇒ whenever P = P1
(c1,c
′
1)====⇒ P2
(c2,c
′
2)====⇒ .... The set
io(P ) = {(α, α′) | P
(α,α′)
====⇒}
denotes the input-output behavior of P . If io(P ) = io(Q) we say that P and Q
are input-output equivalent and we write P ∼io Q. Furthermore, we say that P
eventually outputs c, written P ⇓c, if P
(trueω,α′)
====⇒ and α′(i) ⊢ c for some i > 0.
Remark 1. Let P be a process and α, α′ be sequences of constraints s.t. (α, α′) ∈
io(P ). Recall that computation in tcc during a time-unit progresses via the
monotonic accumulation of constraints [24]. Then for all i > 0, c′(i) ⊢ c(i).
Recall also that the final store at the end of the time-unit is not automatically
transfered to the next one. Therefore, it may be the case that c(i)′ 6⊢ c(i − 1)′.
Constraints in α are provided by the environment as input to the system and
then, they are not supposed to be related to each other.
In [23], utcc is shown to be deterministic in the following sense:
Theorem 1 (Determinism [23]). Let α, α′ and β be sequences of constraints.
If both (β, α), (β, α′) ∈ io(P ) then for all i > 0, ⊢ α(i)⇔ α′(i). I.e. the outputs
of P are the same up to logical equivalence.
Remark 2. The reader may have noticed that the abstraction operator may in-
duce an infinite sequence of internal transitions within a time interval thus never
producing an observable transition. One source of infinite internal behavior in-
volves looping (recursion) in abstractions. E.g.
R = (abs x; out1(x)) ((local z) tell(out1(z)))
with out1 as in Example 1. A similar problem involves several abstractions
producing mutual recursive behavior. Another source of infinite internal behavior
involves the constraint system under consideration. Let
R = (abs x; c)P.
If the current store d entails c[t/x] for infinitely many t’s, then R will have to
execute P [t/x] for each such t.
We shall see that there are meaningful utcc processes which do not exhibit
infinite internal behavior. We call them well-terminated processes. In fact, we
shall prove in the next section that they are sufficient to show that utcc is
Turing-powerful.
Definition 9 (Well-termination). The process P is said to be well-terminated
iff for every α, there exists α′ such as (α, α′) ∈ io(P ).
Nevertheless, in Section 5 we shall consider also non well-terminated pro-
cesses. For this purpose, we will recall in Section 5.1 the alternative symbolic
operational semantics given in [23] which deals with the above-mentioned inter-
nal termination problems.
4 Expressiveness of UTCC
In this section we shall state the Turing expressiveness of utcc with monadic
first-order logic as underlying constraint system. We shall also state our main
application result, namely the undecidability of the validity problem for Monadic
FLTL without equality nor function symbols.
4.1 Turing-Expressiveness of UTCC
We shall begin by showing that the sub-language of well-terminated utcc pro-
cesses is Turing-powerful. We prove this by providing a utcc construction (or en-
coding) of two-counter machines, also called Minsky machines, which are known
to be Turing-powerful [20]. This construction will be defined in terms of a very
simple decidable underling constraint system: The monadic fragment of first-
order logic without function symbols nor equality. This is a key property for our
undecidability result for FLTL.
A two-counter Minsky machine M(v0, v1) is an imperative program consist-
ing of a sequence of labeled instructions L1; . . . ;Lk which modify the values
of two non-negative counters c0 and c1 initially set to v0 and v1 (resp.). The
instructions, using counters cn for n ∈ {0, 1}, are of three kinds:
Li : halt
Li : cn := cn + 1; goto Lj
Li : if cn = 0 then goto Lj else cn := cn − 1; gotoLk
The Minsky machine starts at Ls and halts if the control reaches the location of
a halt instruction. Furthermore, the Minsky machine M(v0, v1) computes the
value n if it halts with c0 = n.
We presuppose a monadic constraint system including the uninterpreted
predicates out, outmn (·) for n ∈ {0, 1} and m ∈ {1, 2} as in Example 1. Ad-
ditionally, we presuppose the following propositional variables: iszn, incn, decn
for n ∈ {0, 1} and halt . A counter is defined as follows cn =
1 !when iszn do
2 unless incn next tell(iszn) ‖
3 when incn do next (local a) (tell(out
1
n(a))||
3′ !when out2n(a) do tell(iszn))
4 ||! (abs z; out1n(z))
5 whenever decn ∨ incn do
6 when decn do next tell(out
2
n(z))||
7 when incn do next (local b) (tell(out
1
n(b))||
7′ !when out2n(b) do tell(out
1
n(z)))
The counters c0 and c1 are obtained by replacing the sub-index n in out
m
n (·),
iszn, incn and decn by 0 and 1 respectively in the expression above. Intuitively,
iszn is used to test if the counter is zero (line 1) and incn and decn to trigger the
action of increment and decrement the counter respectively. Each time an incre-
ment instruction is executed, a new local variable is created and sent through
the public channel out1n(·) (lines 3 and 7). Decrement operations (line 6) send
back these local variables using the channel out2n(·). The processes in lines 3
′
and 7′ when receiving the correspondent local variable on channel out2n(·) move
to the state immediately before the last increment instruction took place.
For the set of instruction L1; . . . ;Ln we assume a set of variables l1, . . . , ln.
The i-th instruction is encoded as
[[Li]] =!when out(li) do ins(Li)
where
ins(Li) =


tell(halt) if Li = halt
tell(incn) ‖ next tell(out(lj)) if Li = cn := cn + 1; goto Lj
when iszn do next tell(out(lj)) ‖ if Li = if cn= 0 then goto Lj
unless iszn next (tell(decn) ‖ else cn := cn−1;gotoLk
next tell(out(lk)))
Without loss of generality assume that counters are initially set to 0. The
program takes the form:
[[M(0, 0)]] = (local l1, . . . , ln) (tell(out(ls)) ‖ c0 ‖ c1 ‖
tell(isz0 ) ‖ tell(isz1 ) ‖
[[L1]] ‖ ... ‖ [[Ln]])
Let Decn be the process decrementing n times the counter c0. If it succeeds,
it outputs the constraint yes:
Dec0 = when isz0 do tell(yes)
Decn = unless isz0 next (tell(dec0 ) ‖ Decn−1 )
For the correctness of the construction, one can verify thatM(0, 0) computes
the value n if and only if after the encoding halts one can decrement c0 exactly
n times until telling “yes”. More precisely:
Theorem 2 (Correctness). A Minsky machine M(0, 0) computes the value n
iff ([[M(0, 0)]] ‖ whenever halt do Decn) ⇓yes
As an application of the above construction we can show the undecidability
of the input-output equivalence for well-terminated processes.
Given M(0, 0) we define [[M(0, 0)]]′ as the above encoding [[M(0, 0)]] ex-
cept that ins(halt) = skip—notice that ins(halt) = tell(halt) in [[M(0, 0)]].
Clearly, M(0, 0) does not halt iff
[[M(0, 0)]]′ ∼io [[M(0, 0)]].
We then obtain the following corollary.
Corollary 1. Fix the underling constraint system to be monadic first-order logic
without equality nor function symbols. Then, the question of whether P ∼io Q,
given two well-terminated processes P and Q, is undecidable.
A more compelling application of the above construction is given in the next
section. In fact, the following result is the main application of the paper.
4.2 Application: Undecidability of monadic FLTL
In this section we shall state a new undecidability result for monadic FLTL as
an application of the above Minsky encoding and the logic characterization of
utcc in [23].
FLTL Characterization. We first need to recall the FLTL characterization of
utcc [23].
Definition 10. Let [[·]] a map from utcc processes to FLTL formulae given by:
[[skip]] = true [[tell(c)]] = c
[[(abs ~y; c)P ]] = ∀~y(c⇒ [[P ]]) [[P ‖ Q]] = [[P ]] ∧ [[Q]]
[[(local ~x; c)P ]] = ∃~x(c ∧ [[P ]]) [[nextP ]] = ◦[[P ]]
[[unless c nextP ]] = c ∨ ◦[[P ]] [[!P ]] = ✷[[P ]]
The compositional encoding in Definition 10 gives a pleasant correspondence
between utcc processes and FLTL formulae.
Theorem 3 (Logic Correspondence [23]). Let [[·]] as in Definition 10 and
⊢T as in Definition 3. If P is a well-terminated process and c a state formula
then
[[P ]] ⊢T ✸c iff P ⇓c .
It should be noticed that the encoding of Minsky machines in the previous
section uses only well-terminated processes.
Quantification of flexible variables. In [18] a FLTL named TLV is studied. The
logic we present in Definition 1 differs from TLV only in that TLV disallows
quantification of flexible variables as well as the past operator. We shall see that
quantification over flexible variables is fundamental for our encoding of Minsky
machines. We also state in Corollary 2 that the past-free monadic fragment of the
FLTL in Section 2 without equality nor function symbols is strongly incomplete.
This in contrast with the same TLV fragment which is decidable wrt validity
[18].
Because of the above-mentioned difference with TLV we shall use the follow-
ing notation:
Notation 3 Henceforth we use TLV-flex to denote the past-free fragment of the
FLTL presented in Section 2, i.e., the set of FLTL formulae without occurrences
of the past modality ⊖.
In [18] it is proven that the problem of validity of a monadic TLV formula
A without equality and function symbols is decidable. This decidability result
is proven the same way as the standard decidability result for classical monadic
first-order logic—By getting rid of quantifiers and reducing the problem to the
decidability of propositional LTL.
Nevertheless, quantification of flexible variables makes impossible to obtain
a prenex form of a formula which may then allows us to get rid of quantifiers
as it can be done for monadic first-order logic. Consider for example the unary
predicate pc(x) testing if x is equal to a constant c. Take the formula F =
(pc(x) ∧ ◦¬pc(x)). If x is a flexible variable, notice that ∃xF is satisfiable
whereas ∃xF is not. Hence, moving quantifier to the outermost position to
get a prenex form does not preserve satisfiability. Notice also that if x is a rigid
variable instead, ∃xF and ∃xF are both logically equivalent to false.
The following proposition follows from composing the encodings from Minsky
machines into utcc and from utcc into FLTL.
Proposition 1. Let M(0, 0) be a Minsky machine and P = [[M(0, 0)]] as defined
in Section 4.1. Let A = [[P ]] be the FLTL formula obtained as in Definition 10.
Then A is a monadic without equality and function symbols TLV-flex formula.
To see the importance of quantifying over flexible variables in the encoding
A = [[P ]], take the output of a in line 3 of the encoding P = [[M(0, 0)]] and assume
that a is rigid. Notice that abstraction in line 4 is replicated, thus corresponding
to a formula of the form ∀z out
1
n(z)⇒ F . Once the formula out
1
n(a) is true, by
the rigidity of a, the formula F [a/z] must be true in the following states, which
does not correspond to the intended meaning of the machine execution. Instead,
if a is flexible, the fact that out1n(a) is true at certain state does not imply that
F [a/z] must be true in the subsequent states.
Now with the help of the above proposition and the encoding we obtain the
following:
Proposition 2. Given a Minsky machine M(0, 0), it is possible to construct a
monadic TLV-flex formula without equality and function symbols FM s.t FM
is valid iff M(0, 0) loops (i.e., it never halts).
Let M(0, 0) be a Minsky machine. Let P = [[M(0, 0)]]′′ where [[M(0, 0)]]′′ is de-
fined as the encoding [[M(0, 0)]] in Section 4.1 except that ins(·) adds tell(running)
in parallel to the encoding of all instructions but halt. For the above proposi-
tion, we can then take FM = A⇒  running, where A = [[P ]] and [[P ]] as given
in Definition 10.
Since the set of looping Minsky machines (i.e. the complement of the halting
problem) is not recursively enumerable, a finitistic axiomatization of monadic
TLV-flex without equality and function symbols would yield to a recursively
enumerable set of tautologies. Therefore such a logic is strongly incomplete.
Corollary 2 (Incompleteness).Monadic TLV-flex without equality and func-
tion symbols is strongly incomplete.
From this corollary it follows that the validity problem in the above-mentioned
monadic fragment of TLV-flex is undecidable.
5 Closure-Operator Semantics
In the previous section we showed that utcc processes can represent Minsky
machines. In this section we show that utcc processes can be represented as
partial closure operators.
More precisely, we shall give a compositional characterization of the input-
output behavior of utcc processes in terms of (partial) closure operators. We
build on the closure operator semantics in [24] for tcc. Because of additional
technical difficulties posed by the abstraction operator of utcc, the codomain
of the closure-operators is more involved than that for tcc. Namely, instead of
sequences of constraints as in tcc, we shall use sequences of future-free temporal
formulae (constraints).
The proposed denotational semantics takes into account also non well-terminated
processes (Definition 9). Consequently, we shall use the alternative symbolic re-
duction semantics in [23] which deals with the infinite internal computation
problems discussed in Section 3.2 (Remark 2).
5.1 Symbolic Semantics
Here we recall the symbolic reduction semantics in [23]. Intuitively, the symbolic
observable reductions use temporal constraints to represent in a finite way a
possibly infinite number of substitutions as well as the information that an infi-
nite loop may provide. This semantics guarantees that every sequence of internal
transitions is finite.
Before defining the symbolic semantics let us give some intuitions of its basic
principles.
A. Substitutions as Constraints. Take R = (abs x; c)P. The operational
semantics performs P [t/x] for every t s.t c[t/x] is entailed by the store d. In-
stead, the symbolic semantics dictates that R should produce e = d∧∀x(c⇒ d′)
where, similarly, d′ should be produced according to the symbolic semantics by
P . Let t be an arbitrary term s.t d ⊢ c[t/x]. The idea is that if e′ is operationally
produced by P [t/x] then e′ should be entailed by d′[t/x]. Since d ⊢ c[t/x] then
e ⊢ d′[t/x] ⊢ e′. Therefore e entails the constraint that any arbitrary P [t/x]
produces.
B. Timed Dependencies in Substitutions. The symbolic semantics rep-
resents as temporal constraints dependencies between substitutions from one
time interval to another. E.g., suppose that for R above, P = next tell(c′). Op-
erationally, once we move to the next time unit, the constraints produced are of
the form c′[t/x] for those t’s s.t the final store d in the previous time unit entails
c[t/x]. The symbolic semantics captures this as e′ = (⊖d)∧∀x((⊖c)⇒ c′) where
⊖ is the “previous” (or “past”) modality in FLTL (see Section 2).
For the symbolic semantics we then use the Future-free fragment of the FLTL
in Definition 1.
Definition 11 (Future-free constraints). A temporal formula is said to be
future-free iff it does not contain occurrences of  and ◦. We shall use e, e′...
to range over future-free formulae and w,w′, v, v′, . . . to range over infinite se-
quences of future-free formulae. Notice that every constraint (i.e., state formula)
is a future-free formula.
We shall assume that processes and configurations are extended to include
future-free formulae rather than just constraints (state formulae). So, for example
a process-store configuration of the form 〈(abs y;⊖c)P,⊖d〉 may appear in the
transitions of the symbolic semantics.
Symbolic Reductions. The internal and observable symbolic transitions −→s
,=⇒s are defined as in Table 1 with ⊢ replaced by ⊢T and with RA and RO
replaced by RAs and ROs in Table 2 resp.
The rule RAs represents with the temporal constraint ∀~x(e ⇒ e
′) the sub-
stitutions that its operational counterpart RA would induce. Notice that in the
reduction of P the variables ~x in e are hidden, via existential quantification, to
avoid clashes with those in P .
The function Fs in ROs is similar to its operational counterpart F in Defini-
tion 7. However, Fs records the final global and local stores as well as abstraction
guards as past information. As explained before, this past information is needed
in next time unit.
RAs
〈P, ∃~xe〉 −→s 〈Q, e
′′ ∧ ∃~xe〉
〈(abs ~x; e′)P, e〉 −→s 〈(abs ~x; e
′)Q, e ∧ ∀~x(e′ ⇒ e′′)〉
ROs
〈P, e〉 −→∗s 〈Q, e
′〉 6−→s
P
(e,e′)
====⇒s Fs(Q, e
′)
Table 2. Symbolic Rules for Internal and Observable Transitions. The function Fs is
given in Definition 12.
Definition 12. Let Fs be a partial function from configurations to processes
defined by Fs(P, e) = tell(⊖e) ‖ F
′(P ) where:
F ′(P ) =


skip if P = skip
(abs ~x;⊖e)F ′(Q) if P = (abs ~x; e)Q
F ′(P1) ‖ F
′(P2) if P = P1 ‖ P2
(local ~x;⊖e)F ′(Q) if P = (local ~x; e)Q
Q if P = nextQ
Q if P = unless c nextQ
Clearly, no infinite sequence of internal transitions γ1 −→s γ2 −→s . . . can
be generated by the symbolic semantics.
We now define the input-output behavior and equivalence for the symbolic
reduction semantics.
Definition 13 (Symbolic Relations). Let e and e′ be future-free formulae.
We write e  e′ whenever e ⊢T e
′. If e  e′ and e′  e we write e ≈ e′. If
e  e′ and e 6≈ e′ then we write e ≻ e′. We extend , ≻ and ≈ to sequences
of future-free formulae: w  v (w ≻ v, w ≈ v) iff for all i > 0, w(i)  v(i)
(w(i) ≻ v(i), w(i) ≈ v(i)).
If P = P1
(e1,e
′
1)====⇒s P2
(e2,e
′
2)====⇒s ..., we write P
(w,w′)
====⇒s where w = e1.e2...
and w′ = e′1.e
′
2... The symbolic input-output behavior ios(P ) is defined as the set
{(w,w′) | P
(w,w′)
====⇒s} modulo ≈ . We write P ∼
io
s Q iff ios(P ) = ios(Q).
As shown in [23], the symbolic reduction semantics and the SOS coincide for
the fragment of abstracted-unless free processes:
Definition 14 (Abstracted-unless free Processes).We say that P is abstracted-
unless free if it has no occurrences of processes of the form unless c nextQ
where c or Q has occurrences of variables under the scope of an abstraction.
The correspondence is confined to this fragment of the calculus due to the
problem of representing the negation of entailment as logic formulae (see [23] for
further details).
Theorem 4 (Semantic Correspondence [23]). Let P be an abstracted-unless
free process. Suppose that P
(c1,d1)
====⇒ P1
(c2,d2)
====⇒ . . .
(ci,di)
====⇒ Pi and P
(c1,e1)
====⇒s
P1
′ (c2,e2)====⇒s . . .
(ci,ei)
====⇒ P ′i . Then for every c ∈ C and j ∈ {1, . . . , i}, dj ⊢ c iff
ej ⊢T c.
5.2 Monotonic fragment and closure operators
In this section we show that ios(P ) is a partial closure operator—see Section 2.
Notice that the “unless” operator unlike the other constructs in utcc exhibits
non-monotonic input-output behavior in the following sense: Given w  w′ and
P = unless c nextQ, if (w, v), (w′, v′) ∈ ios(P ), it may be the case that v
′  v.
E.g., take Q = tell(d), w = c. trueω and w′ = trueω.
Definition 15 (Monotonic Processes). We say that P is a monotonic pro-
cess iff P does not have occurrences of processes of the form unless c nextQ.
In fact, for a monotonic process P, ios(P ) is a closure operator. The next
proposition basically follows from the corresponding closure-operator properties
for internal symbolic transition which in turn can be proven by induction on the
(depth of) derivation of internal symbolic transitions.
Proposition 3 (Closure Properties). Let P be an arbitrary utcc process.
We have the following:
– Extensiveness: If (w,w′) ∈ ios(P ) then w
′  w
– Idempotence: If (w,w′) ∈ ios(P ) then (w
′, w′) ∈ ios(P )
– Monotonicity: if P is monotonic, (w1, w2) ∈ ios(P ) and w
′
1  w1, then
there exists w′2 such that (w
′
1, w
′
2) ∈ ios(P ) and w
′
2  w2.
A pleasant property of closure operators is that they are uniquely determined
by its set of fixed points; here referred to as strongest postcondition.
Definition 16 (Strongest Postcondition). Given a utcc process P , the set
sps (P ) = {w | (w,w) ∈ ios(P )}
denotes the strongest postcondition of P . Moreover, if w ∈ sps(P ), we say that
w is a quiescent sequent for P , i.e. P under input w cannot add any information
whatsoever. Define P ∼sps Q iff sps(P ) = sps(Q).
Recall that the symbolic semantics transfers the final store of a time-unit to
the next one as a past formula (Definition 12). Therefore, for any process P , if
s ∈ sps(P ) then s is a past-monotonic sequence in the following sense.
Definition 17 (Past-Monotonic Sequences, PM). We say that an infinite
sequence of future-free formulae w is past-monotonic iff for all i > 1, w(i) ⊢T
⊖w(i − 1). The set of infinite sequences of past-monotonic formulae is denoted
by PM .
Before relating the input-output behavior with the strongest postcondition
of a process, we need to introduce the following notation.
Notation 4 The upper closure of a future-free formula e is the set {e′ | e′  e}
and we write ↑ e. We extend this notion to sequences by decreeing that ↑ w =
{w′ | w′  w}.
The input-output behavior of a monotonic process can be retrieved from
its strongest postcondition. This characterization is expressed by the following
corollary, whose proof is standard, given that ios(P ) is a closure operator.
Corollary 3. Let min be the minimum function wrt the order induced by .
Given a monotonic utcc process P ,
(w,w′) ∈ ios(P ) iff w
′ = min(sps (P )∩ ↑ w)
Therefore to characterize the input-output behavior of P , it suffices to specify
sps (P ). In the next section we give a denotational semantics [[·]] that aims at
specifying sps (·) compositionally.
5.3 Denotational Model
This section presents a denotational model for the strongest postcondition of
utcc processes. This semantics is built on the closure operator semantics for
tcc in [24]. We will briefly discuss the technical problems in giving a closure
operator semantics for the abstraction process.
We need the following notations.
Notation 5 Given the sequence of variables ~x = x1, ..., xn, ∃~x stands for the
expression ∃x1∃x2 ...∃xn . We shall use ∃~xw to denote the sequence obtained by
pointwise applying ∃~x to each constraint in w. Similarly, w ∧ w
′ denotes the
sequence v such that v(i) = w(i) ∧ w′(i) for i > 0. Abusing of the notation,
for ~x /∈ fv(w) we understand that none of the variables in ~x occurs free in the
constraints of w.
The equations for the local and abstraction operators involve the notion of
~x-variants. Basically, two formulae (or sequences of formulae) are ~x-variant if
they are the same except for the information about the variables in ~x. Formally:
Definition 18 (~x-variant). We say that e and e′ are ~x-variants if ∃~xe = ∃~xe
′.
Similarly, the sequence w is an ~x-variant of the sequence w′ iff ∃~xw = ∃~xw
′.
The denotational semantics is defined as a function [[·]] which associates to
each process a set of infinite sequences of past-monotonic formulae, namely [[·]] :
Proc → P(PM ). The definition of [[·]] is given in Figure 1. Recall that [[P ]] is
meant to capture the quiescent sequences of P ; those sequences P cannot add
any information whatsoever—i.e., the strongest postcondition of P .
Let us first give some intuition about the semantics of processes that do not
bind variables. So, skip cannot add any information to any sequence in PM
(DS). The sequences to which tell(c) cannot add information are those whose
first element can entail c (DT). A sequence is quiescent for P ‖ Q if it is for P
and Q (DP). Process nextP has not influence in the first element of a sequence,
thus e.w is quiescent for it if w is quiescent for P (DN). A similar explanation
can be given for the process unless c nextP (DU). A sequence is quiescent for
!P if every suffix of it is quiescent for P (DR).
We now consider the binding processes. A sequence w is quiescent for Q =
(local ~x; c)P if there exists an ~x-variant w′ of w s.t. w′ is quiescent for P . Hence,
if P cannot add any information to w′ then Q cannot add any information to w.
To see this notice that w and w′ are ~x-variants; i.e., they are the same except
possibly on the information about the variables in ~x. Clearly Q cannot add any
information on (the global variables) ~x appearing in w. So, if Q were to add
information to w, then P could also do the same to w′. But the latter is not
possible since w′ is quiescent for P .
Now, we may then expect that the semantics for the abstraction can be
straightforwardly obtained in a similar fashion by quantifying over all possible
~x-variants. Nevertheless, this is not the case as we shall illustrate below.
Denotation of Abstraction Using ~x-variants Recall that the ask tcc pro-
cess when c do Q is a shorthand for the empty abstraction process (abs ǫ; c)Q
(Notation 1). Recall also that T denotes the set of all terms in the under-
lying constraint system. The first intuition for the denotation of the process
P = (abs ~x; c)Q is given with the following equation.
⋂
~t∈T |~x|
[[(when c do Q)[~t/~x]]]
where [[when c do Q]] is the usual denotational equation for the ask processes
in tcc, i.e.
[[when c do Q]] = {w | w(1) ⊢T c implies w ∈ [[Q]]}
This equation arises directly from the fact that P can be viewed as the (possibly
infinite) parallel composition of the processes (when c do Q)[~t/~x] for every
sequence of terms ~t ∈ T |~x|.
Nevertheless we can give a denotational equation for abstraction which is
analogous to that of the local operator. By using the notion of ~x-variants the
equation does not appeal to substitution as the one above. As illustrated below
the denotation of abstraction is not entirely dual to the denotation of the local
operator. The lack of duality between DL and DA is reminiscent of the result in
CCP [11] stating that negation does not correspond exactly to the complemen-
tation (See [9, 11]).
Notation 6 Given a sequence e1.e2..., we use e1.e2... to denote the past-monotonic
sequence
e1.(e2 ∧⊖e1).(e3 ∧⊖e2 ∧⊖
2e1)..
Example 2. Let Q = (abs x; c)P where c = out (x) and P = tell(out′(x)). Take
the past-monotonic sequence
w = (out(0) ∧ out′(0)). trueω ∈ sps (Q).
Suppose that we were to give the following definition of [[Q]]:
{w | for every x-variant w′ of w if w′(1) ⊢T c then w
′ ∈ [[P ]]}
Let 0 be a term. Notice that we have an x-variant
w′ = (out(0) ∧ out′(0) ∧ out(x)). trueω
of w s.t. w′(1) ⊢T c but w
′ /∈ [[P ]]. Then w /∈ [[Q]] under this naive definition of
[[Q]].
We fix the above definition in Equation DA by using the following condition
w′  (~x = ~t)ω.
for a sequence of terms ~t s.t. |~t| = |~x| and ~t 6
.
= ~x. Intuitively, this condition
together with w′(1) ⊢T c requires that w
′(1) ⊢T c∧~x = ~t and hence that w
′(1) ⊢T
cσ for a substitution σ = [~t/~x]. Furthermore w′  (~x = ~t)ω together with w′ ∈
[[P ]] realizes the operational intuition that P runs under the substitution σ. In
fact the denotation satisfies the following:
Proposition 4. Let [[·]] as in Figure 1 and Q = (abs ~x; c)P .
w ∈ [[Q]] iff w ∈
⋂
~t∈T |~x|
[[(when c do P )[~t/~x]]]
DS [[skip]] = PM
DT[[tell(c)]] = {e.w ∈ PM | e ⊢T c}
DP[[P ‖ Q]] = [[P ]] ∩ [[Q]]
DN[[nextP ]] = {e.w ∈ PM | w ∈ [[P ]]}
DU[[unless c nextP ]] = {e.w ∈ PM | e 6⊢T c and w ∈ [[P ]]}∪
{e.w ∈ PM | e ⊢T c}
DR[[!P ]] = {w ∈ PM | for all v, v
′ s.t. w = v.v′,
v′ ∈ [[P ]]}
DL [[(local ~x; c)P ]] = {w ∈ PM | there exists an ~x-variant
w′ of w s.t w′(1) ⊢T c and w
′ ∈ [[P ]]}
DA[[(abs ~x; c)P ]] = {w ∈ PM | for every ~x-variant w
′ of w
if w′(1) ⊢T c and w
′  (~x = ~t)ω
for some ~t s.t. |~x| = |~t| and ~x 6
.
= ~t then
w′ ∈ [[P ]]}
Fig. 1. Denotational Semantics for utcc. The function [[·]] is of type Proc → P(PM ).
In DA, ~x = ~t denotes the constraint
V
1≤i≤|~x| xi = ti and ~t 6
.
= ~x stands for point-wise
syntactic difference, i.e.
V
1≤i≤|~x| ti 6
.
= xi (see Sect. 2). If |~x| = 0 then ~x = ~t and ~x 6
.
= ~t
are defined as true.
5.4 Full-abstraction
In this section we show the correspondence between the symbolic reduction se-
mantics of utcc and the denotational one.
Soundness. The soundness of the denotation holds for the abstracted-unless free
fragment of utcc (see Definition 14). The technical reason is that in proving
sps(P ) ⊆ [[P ]] for P = (abs x; c)Q where x ∈ fv(Q) we need Q to be monotonic
(Definition 15).
Theorem 5 (Soundness). Given an abstracted-unless free process P , sps(P ) ⊆
[[P ]]
The proof of the above theorem proceeds by induction on the size of P . Here
we only outline the main steps of the abstraction case P = (abs ~x; c)Q —the
other cases proceed as in [22]. As a mean of contradiction assume that w ∈ sps(P )
and w /∈ [[P ]]. By using alpha-conversion we can assume that ~x /∈ fv(w). Since
w /∈ [[P ]] then let w′ be an ~x-variant of w s.t. w′(1) ⊢T c, w
′  (~x = ~t)ω with
~x 6
.
= ~t and w′ /∈ [[Q]]. By hypothesis w′ 6∈ sps(Q). Since P is abstracted-unless free
thenQ is a monotonic process and thusQ
(w′,v′)
====⇒s for a v
′ ≻ w′. We can now use
the facts that w′  (~x = ~t)ω and that w′ is an ~x-variant of w to verify that (Q ‖
! tell(~x = ~t))
(w′,v′)
====⇒s and thus that R = (local ~x) (Q ‖! tell(~x = ~t))
(w,∃~xv
′)
====⇒s.
We then show that R ∼ios Q[~t/~x] and hence (w,∃~xv
′) ∈ ios(Q[~t/~x]). Since w and
w′ are ~x-variants, ~x /∈ fv(w) and v′ ≻ w′ then ∃~xv
′ ≻ w. Therefore,
w /∈ sps(Q[~t/~x])
Notice that because w′(1) ⊢T c and w
′  (~x = ~t)ω we have w′(1) ⊢T c[~t/~x], and
thus w(1) ⊢T c[~t/~x] since w and w
′ are ~x-variants. This leads to a contradiction
by verifying that for all w,~t if w ∈ sps(P ) and w(1) ⊢T c[~t/~x] it must be the
case that w ∈ sps(Q[~t/~x]).
Completeness. For completeness we have similar technical problems that in the
case of tcc [22] namely: the combination between the local and the “unless”
operator—see [22] for details. Thus as in [22] the full abstraction is achieved
only for the locally independent fragment.
Definition 19 (Locally Independent Processes). We say that P is locally
independent iff P has no occurrences of processes of the form unless c nextQ
under the scope of a local operator.
The use of the abstracted-unless free condition in the completeness result is
analogous to that for soundness.
Theorem 6 (Completeness). Given a locally independent and abstracted-unless
free process P , [[P ]] ⊆ sps(P )
Similar to the case of soundness, the proof of completeness proceeds by in-
duction on the size of P . Here we only outline the main steps of the abstrac-
tion case P = (abs ~x; c)Q. As a mean of contradiction assume that w ∈ [[P ]]
and w /∈ sps(P ). By alpha-conversion we can assume that ~x /∈ fv(w). Since
w /∈ sps(P ) then one can verify that we have a ~t 6
.
= ~x s.t. w(1) ⊢ c[~t/~x] and
w /∈ sps(Q[~t/~x]).
Let w′ = w ∧ (~x = ~t)ω. Notice that w′ is an ~x-variant of w because ~x /∈ fv(w).
Thus, since w(1) ⊢T c[~t/~x] then w
′(1) ⊢T c[~t/~x]. From w ∈ [[P ]], and Equation
DA, w
′ ∈ [[Q]] and by hypothesis w′ ∈ sps(Q). Using Rule RAs and the fact that
w /∈ sps(P ), we can show that w /∈ sps (Q). Since w
′ ∈ sps(Q) then Q
(w′,w′)
====⇒s.
From this we can verify that (Q ‖! tell(~x = ~t))
(w′,w′)
====⇒s and Q[~t/~x]
(w,w)
====⇒s.
Therefore, w ∈ sps(Q[~t/~x]), a contradiction.
Full Abstraction. From Corollary 3, soundness and completeness, we can derive
the following full-abstraction result.
Corollary 4 (Full abstraction). Let P and Q be locally independent and
monotonic processes and [[·]] as in Figure 1. Then
P ∼ios Q iff [[P ]] = [[Q]].
Therefore, the input-output behavior of the monotonic locally-independent
fragment of utcc can be compositionally specified in terms of closure operators.
To illustrate the applicability of this fragment, in the next section we shall iden-
tify a language for security protocols whose semantics can be given in terms of
this kind of closure operators.
Remark 3. Notice that the connection between the operational semantics and
the denotational semantics for well-terminated processes follows from Theorem
4 and the soundness and completeness results in this section.
5.5 Application: A security process language
Cryptographic protocols aims at communicating agents securely over an un-
trusted network. Several process languages have been defined to analyze these
protocols [10, 3, 4, 6]. Typically, these calculi provide a mechanism for commu-
nication of private names (nonces) and they are parametric in an entailment
relation over a logic for reasoning about cryptographic properties.
In this section we show how the monotonic locally-independent fragment of
utcc and its closure operator characterization can be used to give meaning to a
process language enjoying the typical features of calculi for security mentioned
above. This language arises as specialization of utcc with a particular crypto-
graphic constraint systems. We will show that processes in the language can be
compositionally specified as closure operators. So, e.g., the set of messages a
protocol may produce can be represented as a closure operator over sequences
of constraints. The least fixed point of this operator may be used to verify if a
secrecy property is not verified by the protocol.
The modeling language: SCCP We shall use a syntax of processes follow-
ing that of SPL [10]. Basically, this language offers primitives to output and
receive messages as well as to generate secrets or nonces (randomly-generated
unguessable items).
Definition 20 (Syntax of SCCP).
Values v, v′ ::= n |x
Keys k ::= pub(v) | priv(v)
Messages M,N ::= v | k | X | (M,N) | {M}k
Patterns Π,Π ′ ::= v | k | X | (Π,Π ′)
Processes R ::= nil
|new(x)R
|out(M).R
|in [M > Π].R
|!R
|R ‖ R
We shall refer to the language given by the above syntax as SCCP (Security
Concurrent Constraint Programming Language). The language includes a set of
names (values) with n, m, A, B ranging over it. These values represent ids of
principals or nonces. The set of keys is built upon two constructors providing
the public (pub(v)) and the private key (priv(v)) associated to a value. Messages
can be constructed from composition (M,N) and encryption {M}k of messages.
As explained below, message decomposition can be obtained by using pattern
matching.
Intuitively, processes in SCCP run in time intervals. The output process
out(M).R broadcasts M over the network and then it behaves as R in the
next time unit. The input in [M > Π].R waits for a message M that matches
the pattern Π and binds the variables occurring in the pattern and then it
behaves like R in the next time unit. For example, for every message of the form
(N,N ′)pub(A), the process in [{M}pub (A) > (x, y)].R executes R[N/x,N
′/y] in
the next time unit. The process new(x)R generates a (nonce) x private to R.
The process nil does nothing; R ‖ R′ denotes the parallel execution of R and
R′. Finally !R denotes the execution of R in each time unit.
Dolev-Yao Constraint System. Typically in the modeling of security protocols
one must take into account all possible actions the attacker may perform. This
attacker is usually given in terms of the Dolev and Yao thread model [14] which
presupposes an attacker that can eavesdrop, disassemble, compose, encrypt and
decrypt messages with available keys. It also presupposes that cryptography is
unbreakable.
Before giving a closure operator semantics to our security language, we then
need a constraint system handling the cryptographic constructs (e.g. encryption,
message composition, etc) and whose entailment relation follows the inferences
a Dolev-Yao attacker may perform.
Definition 21. Let Σs be a signature with constant symbols in V, function sym-
bols enc, pair , priv and pub and unary predicate out. Let ∆s be the closure under
deduction of { F | ⊢s F } with ⊢s as in Table 3. The (secure) constraint system
is the pair (Σs, ∆s).
PRJ
F ⊢s out((m1,m2)) i ∈ {1, 2}
F ⊢s out(mi)
PAIR
F ⊢s out(m1) F ⊢s out(m2)
F ⊢s out((m1,m2))
ENC
F ⊢s out(m) F ⊢s out(k)
F ⊢s out({m}k)
DEC
F ⊢s out(priv(k)) F ⊢s out({m}pub(k))
F ⊢s out(m)
Table 3. Security constraint system entailment relation.
Intuitively, V represents the set of principal ids, nonces and values. We use
{m}k and (m1,m2) resp., for enc(m, k) (encryption) and pair(m1,m2)(composition).
Rule ENC says that if one can infer that the message m as well as a key k are
output on the global channel out, then one may as well infer that {m}k is also
output on out. The other rules can be explained similarly.
A Protocol in SCCP To illustrate the language consider the following sim-
plification of the Denning-Sacco key distribution protocol [13]:
msg1 A→ B : {(A,m)}pub(B)
msg2 B → A : {n}pub(m)
This protocol involves two principals A and B. In the first step, A sends to B
the message {A,m}pub(B) representing the composition of the A’s identifier and
the nonce m encrypted with the B’s public key. With its private key, B decrypts
the message sent by A and he sends a new nonce n encrypted with the public
key generated from m. The property that must be verified is that only A and B
can know n.
Assume the following execution of the protocol between A,B and C. Here
C is an intruder, i.e. a malicious agent playing the role of a principal in the
protocol.
msg1 A→ C : {(A,m)}pub (C)
msg′1 C → B : {(A,m)}pub (B)
msg2 B → A : {n}pub(m)
In this execution, the attacker replies to B the message sent by A and B
believes that he is establishing a session key with A. Since the attacker knows
the nonce m from the first message, he can decrypt the message {n}pub (m) and
n is not longer a secret between A and B as intended.
We model the behavior of the initiator and the responder in our running
example as follows:
Init(A,B) ≡ !new(m)
out({(A,m)}pub(B)).nil
Resp(B) ≡ ! in [M > {(x, u)}pub(B)].
new(n)
out({n}pub (u)).nil
Spy ≡ ‖A∈P !out(A).nil
‖A∈P !out(pub(A)).nil
‖A∈Bad !out(priv(A)).nil
The process Spy corresponds to the initial knowledge the attacker has. Given the
set of principals of the protocol P, the spy knows all the names of the principals
in the protocol and their public keys. He also knows a set of private keys denoted
by Bad. This set represents the leaked keys, for example, the private key of C
in the above configuration exhibiting the secrecy flaw.
Notice that the processes Init and Resp are replicated. This models the fact
that principal may initiate different sessions during the execution of the protocol.
Closure Operators for SCCP The following definition interprets SCCP pro-
cesses as monotonic utcc processes.
Definition 22. Let I be a function from SCCP to monotonic utcc processes
defined by:
I =


skip if R = nil
(localx) I (R′) if R = new(x)R′
! tell(out(M)) ‖ next I (R′) if R = out(M).R′
(abs ~x; c)next I (R′) if R = in [M > Π].R′
‖i∈I I (Ri) if R =‖i∈I Ri
! I (R′) if R =!R′
where ~x = fv(Π) and c = out (M) ∧ (M = Π).
It is easy to see that the above interpretation realizes the behavioral intuition
of SCCP given before. Intuitively the output out(M) is mapped to a process
adding the constraint out (M). Since the final store in utcc is not automatically
transferred to the next time interval, the process tell(out(M)) is replicated. This
reflects the fact that the attacker can remember all the messages posted over the
network.
For the case of inputs, we use the guard of the abstraction operator to check
if the input received matches with the pattern Π. Take for example Resp(B) in
our example. This process is interpreted via I above as:
! (abs x, u; out({M}pub(B)) ∧M = (x,w))nextQ
where Q = I (new(n)out({n})pub(u).nil). When a constraint of the form
out({(N,N ′)}pub(B)) can be deduced from the current store, the processQ[N/x,N
′/y]
is executed in the next time unit as expected.
The following function maps our security processes into its set of fixed points
as specified in Figure 1—i.e., its strongest postcondition.
Definition 23. For any SCCP process R we define [[R]]SCCP as [[I (R)]] with
I (·) as in Definition 22 and [[·]] as in Fig. 1.
Since the interpretation function I is given in terms of the monotonic frag-
ment of utcc, it follows from Section 5.4 that [[R]]SCCP corresponds to a closure
operator.
Modeling Secrecy Properties. We can represent protocols in such a way that
potential attacks can be specified as the least fixed point of the closure operators
representing them. To detect when the secret created by Resp is revealed by the
attacker, we modify the definition of this process as follows:
Resp′(B) ≡ ! in [M > {(x, u)}pub(B)].
new(n)(out({n}pub(u)).nil) ‖
! in [Y > n].out(attack).nil)
Intuitively, Resp′ outputs the message attack when the message n appears
unencrypted on the network, i.e., when out(n) can be deduced from the current
store.
Recall that false is an absorbing element for conjunction and it is the great-
est future-free formulae wrt . Our approach is then to add the constraint false
when the message attack can be read from the network. In terms of the closure
operator semantics it implies that if a process R outputs the message attack,
then the least fixed point of the closure operator representing R is a sequence
whose suffix is the sequence falseω. More precisely,
Proposition 5. Let R be a SCCP process. Let f be defined as
[[R]]SCCP ∩ [[!when out(attack) do ! tell(false)]]
Therefore, I (R) ⇓attack iff the least-fixed point of the closure operator corre-
sponding to f takes the form w. falseω
The previous proposition allows us to exhibit the secrecy flaw in our running
example. I.e., let P = {A,B,C} be the set of principal names and Bad = {C}
be the set of leaked keys in our previous protocol example. Given the process
DS = Init(A,C) ‖X∈P Resp
′(X) and
f = [[DS]]SCCP ∩ [[!when out(attack) do !tell(false)]]
The least fixed point v of f takes the form v = w. falseω .
Closure Properties of a Spy. We conclude this section by pointing out that the
interpretation of the behavior of protocols as closure operators is a natural one.
To see our intuition, let us suppose that f is a closure operator denoting a SCCP
Spy eavesdropping and producing information in the network.
– f(w)  w: The Spy produces new information from the one he obtains.
– If w  v then f(w)  f(v): The more information the Spy gets, the more he
will infer.
– f(f(w)) = f(w): The Spy infers as much as possible from the info he gets.
6 Concluding Remarks and Related Work
We showed that unlike the processes of its predecessor tcc, utcc processes can
represent Turing-powerful formalisms. As an application we showed the undecid-
ability of monadic FLTL without function symbols nor equality. We also showed
that like for tcc processes, utcc can be represented as partial closure operators.
As an application we identify a language for security in which protocols can be
represented as closure operators. The language arose as a specialization of utcc
in a particular cryptographic constraint system.
Expressiveness of TCC and FLTL. The expressivity of CCP-based languages
has been explored in [24, 21, 28]. These works show that tcc processes are finite-
state. The results in [21] also imply that the processes of the extension of tcc
with arbitrary recursive definitions are not finite-state. Nevertheless these results
do not imply that they can encode Turing-expressive formalisms.
There are several works addressing the decidability of fragments of FLTL.
In Section 4 we already discussed that in [18] showing that the validity problem
in monadic TLV without equality and function symbols is decidable. As men-
tioned before, TLV unlike TLV-flex does not allow quantification over flexible
variables. Our decidability results justifies the imposition of this quantification
restriction.
The work in [21] shows the decidability of the satisfiability problem restricted
to negation-free TLV-flex formulae. It was also suggested in [21] that one could
dispense with this restriction. This paper refutes this since in the absence of this
restriction one can obviously define universal quantification (not present in the
negation-free fragment of [21]) and then be able to reproduce the encoding of
looping Minsky machines here presented.
Based on the undecidability result of TLV(∅) [27] (i.e. TLV with the empty set
of predicates), [18] proves an incompleteness result for monadic without equality
and function symbols TLP logic. Unlike TLV, in TLP the interpretation of the
predicates is flexible (state dependent) and all the variables are rigid. [18] also
relates undecidability results of n-adic fragments of TLP with undecidability
results of n + 1-adic fragments of TLV. Thus adding binary predicates turns
TLV strongly incomplete. In [16] the monodic fragment of FLTL is introduced. A
formula is monodic if every subformulae beginning with a temporal operator have
at most one free variable. In this case the authors use a TLP-like semantics and
conclude that the set of valid formulae in the 2-variable monadic fragment (i.e.
monadic formulae with at most 2 distinct individual variables) is not recursively
enumerable even considering finite domains in the interpretation. Nevertheless
validity in the fragment of 2-variable monodic formulae is decidable. In [12]
these results are extended claiming the undecidability for validity in the monodic
monadic 2-variable with equality fragment of TLP.
Closure-Operator Semantics and Security. As previously mentioned the closure-
operator semantics for utcc builds on that for its predecessor tcc in [24] and
[22]. The denotation in these works map processes into sequences of constraints.
Because of the technical difficulties posed by the abstraction operator our de-
notation maps instead processes into sequences of past-monotonic sequences of
future-free FLTL formulae.
Several process languages have been defined to analyze security protocols. For
instance Crazzolara and Winskel’s SPL [10], the spi calculus variants by Abadi
[3] and Amadio [4], and Boreale’s calculus in [6] are all operationally defined in
terms of configurations containing items of information (messages) which can
only increase during evolution. Such monotonic evolution of information is akin
to the notion of monotonic store in CCP. Moreover, the calculi in [4, 6, 15] are
parametric in an entailment relation over a logic for reasoning about protocol
properties very much like CCP is parametric in an entailment relation over an
underlying constraint system.
Although utcc can be used to reason about certain aspects of security proto-
cols (e.g., secrecy), it was not specifically designed for this application domain.
Here we illustrated how the closure operator semantics of utcc may offer new
reasoning techniques for the verification of security protocols. We also argued for
the closure operators as a natural characterization of the information that can
be inferred (e.g., by Spy) from a protocol. Furthermore, the closure operator se-
mantics presented here and the full abstraction theorem in Section 5.4 may allow
us to tailor techniques based on behavioral equivalences, e.g. [3, 15], for analyz-
ing security protocols. An example modeling the Needham-Schroeder protocol in
utcc was presented in [23]. This example however uses non-monotonic processes
which do not allow a closure-operator representation. To our knowledge closure
operators had not been considered in the study of security protocols.
The successful logic programming approach to security protocols in [2] is
closely related to ours. Basically, in [2] protocols are modeled as a set of Horn
clauses rather than processes. The verification of the secrecy property relies in
deducing (or proving that it is not possible) the predicate attack(M) from the
set of Horn clauses. A benefit from our approach is that we can overcome the
problem of false attacks pointed in [5]. E.g. Consider a piece data that needs to
be kept secret in a first phase of the protocol and later is revealed when is not
longer a secret. Because the lack of temporal dependency this may generate a
false attack. The temporal approach presented here allows us to control when
a message is required to be secret. The work in [5] also avoid false attacks by
using a linear logic approach rather than a temporal one.
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